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"NOT OUR PROBLEM:" CONSTRUCTION
TRADE UNIONS AND HOSTILE
ENVIRONMENT DISCRIMINATION
Emily White*
And I explained why I didn't think there should be a drinking party
with a stripper on a union job site. 'Just because we have to take you
in," the steward said, "doesn't mean anything has to change because
you're here. "
Labor unions have been instrumental in improving wages and
working conditions for millions of construction workers. In an in-
dustry where the job market is inherently temporary and unstable,
union construction workers receive high wages, enjoy generous
pensions and benefits, and are protected in the workplace by col-
lective bargaining agreements that are vigorously enforced by
union officials. However, to this day, most construction trade un-
ions are composed mainly of white men, and their success in im-
proving working conditions has not been shared by women and
minority workers.'
Unions in the construction trades have historically employed a
variety of tactics to exclude women and minorities. These have in-
cluded administering invalid admission tests to limit union mem-
bership;3 providing inadequate training to women and minority
* City University of New York School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2007. Thanks to the
women of Operation Punch List and the Women Rebuild Project at Legal Momen-
tum, particularly Christina Brandt-Young, FrangoiseJacobsohn, Brigitte Watson, and
Gillian Thomas for your inspiration. Thanks also to Professor Andrea McArdle, Pro-
fessor Shirley Lung, Augustus T. White, and my classmates in Rights of Low-Wage
Workers for advice and encouragement. Finally, thanks to the construction staff from
Habitat for Humanity NYC for teaching me how to build.
I Susan Eisenberg, Marking Gender Boundaries: Porn, Piss, Power Tools, in WE'LL
CALL IF WE NEED You: EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN WORKING CONSTRUCTION 69 (Cornell
Univ. Press 1998) [hereinafter WE'LL CALL IF WE NEED YOU].
2 Although female workers constituted 46.4% of the total workforce in the United
States in 2005, only 1.9% of carpenters, 1.2% of plumbers, and 2.6% of electricians
were women. Similarly, while African Americans constituted 10.8% of the total
workforce in 2005, only 4.8% of carpenters, 8.1% of electricians, and 8.9% of plumb-
ers nationwide were African-American. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICs, HOUSEHOLD
DATA ANNUAL AVERAGES (2005).
3 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (holding that use of an
employment test with a disproportionate racial impact violates Title VII unless the test
has a manifest relationship to the skills particularly required for the position).
245
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
apprentices;4 failing to include nondiscrimination language in the
union constitution and collective bargaining agreement;5 refusing
to refer women and minorities to jobs;6 failing to pursue grievances
for members experiencing discrimination;' and perhaps most ef-
fective, contributing to hostile work environment harassment of
women and minorities.8
Despite the historical exclusion of women and minorities from
unions in the construction trades, labor union membership still
presents a tremendous opportunity for higher wages and improved
working conditions for these workers. For instance, a woman em-
ployed as a union journeyman plumber earns on average more
than twice the salary of a health aide,9 enjoys greater flexibility in
employment hours and location, and often receives pension and
healthcare benefits. In order for this opportunity to be fully real-
ized, however, courts must extend greater protection under Title
VII to women and minorities in the construction industry by hold-
ing unions responsible when they perpetuate hostile environment
discrimination in the workplace.
A unique feature of unions in the construction industry is
their unusual degree of control over the terms and conditions of
employment. Due to the temporary nature of the employment re-
lationship-construction workers often have dozens of employers
over the course of a career but remain members of the same
union-employers rely on unions to perform many tasks that are
traditionally performed only by employers. These may include job
4 See Susan Eisenberg, Ain't Got to Show You Shit, in WE'LL CALL IF WE NEED You,
supra note 1, at 49-50.
5 See, e.g., Farmer v. ARA Serv., Inc., 660 F.2d 1096, 1104 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding
that the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement were discriminatory in op-
eration and effect); Copeland v. IBEW Local No. 8, No. 302CV7240, 2005 WL
1353905, at *8 (N.D. OhioJune 7, 2005) (holding that the union's failure to include a
nondiscrimination provision in the collective bargaining agreement did not amount
to a violation of Title VII).
6 Susan Eisenberg, Doors, Windows, Locks, in WE'LL CALL IF WE NEED You, supra
note 1, at 21.
7 See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1987) (holding that the
union violated Title VII where it failed to process grievances of African-American
union members claiming racial discrimination).
8 See Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local 600, No. 91-1507, 1993 WL 235491
(E.D. Pa. July 24, 1993), afJ'd, 43 F.3d 1463 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the labor
union created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII by purchasing and
displaying pornographic calendars stamped with the union logo).
9 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the national mean wage for a
plumber or pipefitter in 2004 was $47,389. On the other hand, the mean annual
wage for health care aides in the same year was $24,374. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY (2004).
246 [Vol. 10:245
"NOT OUR PROBLEM"
training, hiring, firing, workplace supervision, and discipline for
workplace infractions. Similarly, the relatively short duration of
most construction projects makes it difficult for individual union
members to get relief from any one employer for workplace
problems. Union members rely on their unions to address issues
that arise at multiple work sites, including safety and discrimina-
tion. Thus, unions in the construction industry occupy a unique
position with respect to hostile work environment race and sex dis-
crimination. Through the exercise of the union's authority in the
workplace and its role as a workplace advocate for members, un-
ions have the power either to prevent discrimination or to perpetu-
ate it. Sadly, many have chosen the latter.
Given the authority exercised by many unions in the construc-
tion industry and the difficulty workers face in seeking relief from
employers, it makes sense to hold unions responsible under federal
anti-discrimination law when they perpetuate workplace discrimi-
nation. Nevertheless in EEOC v. Pipefitter's Association Local Union
597, an influential recent case involving a hostile work environ-
ment race discrimination claim against a plumber's union, the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the union was not
responsible for racially hostile graffiti in portable toilets reserved
for plumbers, despite a district court finding that the union had
assumed responsibility for the toilets' condition."'
Instead, the court held that hostile work environment discrim-
ination is primarily the responsibility of employers, and that labor
unions have no affirmative duty under Title VII to prevent or rem-
edy workplace discrimination.1' Other scholars and commentators
examining the issue of hostile work environment discrimination
have focused on the elements of a hostile environment claim. 12 Yet
in many cases arising in the construction industry, the issue is not
whether discrimination has occurred but who is responsible for
10 EEOC v. Pipefitters Ass'n Local Union 597, 334 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding that unions have no affirmative duty to investigate and remedy hostile work
environment discrimination).
I Ild.
12 See, e.g., Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment to Be "Severe or Pervasive" Discriminates Among "Terms and Conditions" of
Employment, 62 MD. L. REV. 85 (2003); Henry L. ChambersJr., (Un)welcome Conduct and
the Sexually Hostile Environment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 733 (2002); Ann C. Juliano, Did She Ask
for It?: The "Unwelcome" Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1558 (1992); Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implica-
tions of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
773 (1993); Rebecca K. Lee, Pink, White, and Blue: Class Assumptions in the Judicial Inter-
pretations of Title VII Hostile Environment Sex Harassment, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 677 (2005).
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preventing and remedying it. The Seventh Circuit's decision in Lo-
cal 597 relieves unions of responsibility for hostile work environ-
ment and harassment even where their inaction has made it harder
for their members to seek relief from the employer. This is true
despite the fact that unions are often in a far better position than
employers to remedy workplace harassment in the construction
industry.
This Article will argue that a union aware of, but unreasonably
failing to address, hostile work environment discrimination against
its members should be liable under Title VII where it exercises a
sufficient degree of control over the workplace to remedy the dis-
criminatory conduct. Part I of this Article will examine hostile
work environment jurisprudence in the Supreme Court and the
courts of appeals prior to Local 597. Part II will discuss the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Local 597 and its impact on subsequent cases.
Part III will critique Local 597, arguing that it is unresponsive to
hostile work environment discrimination in the construction indus-
try; is out of harmony with the remedial purpose of Title VII; and
fails to address the unique authority of construction unions over
workplace conditions. Finally, Part IV will argue that unions
should be liable under. Title VII for hostile work environment dis-
crimination in the construction industry provided that certain fac-
tors are met, and it will discuss and respond to possible criticism of
this standard.
I. UNION LIABILITY FOR HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT UNDER
TITLE VII PRIOR TO EEOC v. PIPEFITTERS ASSOCIATION
LocAL 597
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimina-
tion based on race, color, sex, religion, and national origin by both
employers and labor unions.13 Where an employer permits the ex-
13 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a),(c) (2000).
Unlawful employment practices
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely af-
fect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
[Vol. 10:245248
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istence of a racially or sexually hostile work environment, courts
have found discrimination actionable under Title VII. It is not so
clear, however, whether and under what circumstances a union
may also be found liable for the existence of a racially or sexually
hostile work environment.
A. Elements of Hostile Work Environment Discrimination
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized hostile work environment sex discrimination and set forth
the standard for determining when a hostile work environment is
actionable under Title VII. 4 In that case, a bank employee was
sexually harassed by her supervisor over a period of four years.1 5
Analogizing to prior circuit court cases recognizing racially hostile
work environment discrimination under Title VII, 6 the Court held
that sexual harassment is actionable as employment discrimination
where it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions
of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working envi-
ronment. ' "1 7 Where a hostile work environment exists, an em-
ployer is not automatically liable; instead, courts are to apply
common-law agency principles to determine the employer's re-
sponsibility. 8 Additionally, the Meritor Court noted that, even
though the employee failed to invoke the company nondiscrimina-
tion policy, the employer was not shielded from responsibility. Be-
cause the policy did not specifically mention sexual harassment
(c) Labor organization practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organiza-
tion-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise discrimi-
nate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for
membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment
any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
14 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
15 Id. at 60.
16 See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), superseded by statute, Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, as recognized
in, EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984); Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902
(llth Cir. 1982).
17 Meitor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238).
18 Id. at 72.
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and required employees to report harassment to their immediate
supervisor-which in this case was the employee's harasser-it was
not "calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come
forward."'"
The Supreme Court further clarified the standard for a plain-
tiff to demonstrate hostile work environment harassment in Hanis
v. Forklift Systems.20 Though the harassment must be extreme and
pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment, it need not
result in actual psychological harm or injury.2' Additionally, the
Court adopted a standard that is both objective and subjective:
Conditions must be such that a reasonable person would find them
hostile or abusive, and the victim must also perceive them as
such.
22
B. Liability for Hostile Environment Discrimination
Most recently, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton23 and Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,24 both decided the same day, the Supreme
Court applied agency principles in holding employers vicariously
liability for hostile work environment harassment by supervisors.
Citing Section 219(2) (d) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency,
25
the Court held that although sexual harassment is usually outside
of the scope of employment, the employer may still be liable where
the harassing supervisor is aided in accomplishing the tort by the
agency relationship. 26 Where discrimination by a supervisor results
in a tangible adverse employment action, such as a change in em-
19 Id. at 72-73.
20 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993) (recognizing hostile work environment as a form of
employment discrimination actionable under Title VII).
21 Id. at 21.
22 Id. at 21-22.
23 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998) (holding that an employer is vicariously liable for the
sexual harassment of a supervisor under Title VII, but the employer may raise two
affirmative defenses: It used reasonable efforts to correct the conduct, and the em-
ployee did not reasonably avoid harassment).
24 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998) (applying agency principles in holding that an em-
ployer may be vicariously liable for the hostile work environment of a supervisor
where the employer made no reasonable efforts to correct the conduct, and the em-
ployee's conduct in avoiding harassment was reasonable).
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (D) (1957).
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting
outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal
and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in ac-
complishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
Id.
26 Elerth, 524 U.S. at 759-62.
250 [Vol. 10:245
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ployment status or assignment, it is clear that the agency relation-
ship aided the discrimination.
21
On the other hand, where there has been no adverse employ-
ment action, an employer has an affirmative defense, which looks
to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct as well as that of
the plaintiff. The purpose of the affirmative defense is to en-
courage employers to take positive steps to prevent unlawful dis-
crimination by their supervisory employees, such as implementing
nondiscrimination policies with effective complaint procedures.28
C. Union Liability for Hostile Environment Discrimination
In Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., the only Supreme Court case to
address the issue of union liability for hostile environment discrim-
ination, the Court found that a union had violated Title VII where
it adopted the practice of refusing to pursue grievances for racial
discrimination by an employer. 2' The union argued that it had a
nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to pursue the grievances,
and therefore it should not be found in violation of Title VII.
3 °
The Court rejected this argument, noting, "The Unions, in effect,
categorized racial grievances as unworthy of pursuit and, while pur-
suing thousands of other legitimate grievances, ignored racial dis-
crimination claims on behalf of blacks, knowing that the employer
was discriminating in violation of the contract."31 The union policy
thus violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1) of Title VII, which makes it
unlawful for a union "to exclude or to expel from its membership,
or otherwise discriminate against, any individual because of his race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. 32
Although the Goodman Court noted that both lower federal
courts in this case held that a union is liable under Title VII for
mere passivity in the face of employer discrimination, its affirm-
ance was based on the evidence "prov[ing] far more than mere
passivity." 33 Justice Powell, joined by Justices Scalia and O'Connor,
dissented from both the majority's finding of union liability and
the lower courts' holding that union acquiescence in an em-
ployer's hostile work environment violates Title VII.3 4 Justice Pow-
27 Id. at 760-62.
28 Id. at 764.
29 Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 669 (1987).
30 Id. at 667-68.
31 Id at 669.
32 Id. at 667 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1)).
33 Id. at 666-67.
34 Id. at 680-81. (Powell, J., dissenting).
2006]
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ell made several arguments in support of the view that Title VII
imposes no affirmative duty on labor unions to oppose hostile work
environment discrimination against its members. 5 He argued that
the language of Title VII, which sets forth different responsibilities
for labor unions and employers, indicates that Congress intended
to prohibit only intentional, active workplace discrimination by un-
ions.3 6 Justice Powell noted that the National Labor Relations Act
employs similar language, but this finding has not been inter-
preted to hold unions responsible for acquiescence in employer
wrongdoing. 7 He also claimed that union members facing dis-
crimination have a meaningful remedy available because they can
bring a Tide VII suit directly against an employer.3" Finally, he ar-
gued that an affirmative obligation would disrupt labor law by forc-
ing unions to give greater priority to employment discrimination
than to other labor issues: "Like other representative entities, un-
ions must balance the competing claims of their constituents. A
union must make difficult choices among goals such as eliminating
racial discrimination in the workplace, removing health and safety
hazards, providing better insurance and pension benefits, and in-
creasing wages."39
On the issue of union liability, the circuits are split in the in-
terpretation of Supreme Court jurisprudence on Title VII hostile
work environment discrimination. While courts in the First,
40
Ninth,41 and Eleventh 42 Circuits have held unions liable for inten-
tional acquiescence in hostile work environment harassment,
courts in the Third,43 Fourth,4 4 Eighth,45 and Tenth46 Circuits have
35 Id. at 670.
36 Goodman at 687-88 (noting that section 2000e-(c) (3) of Title VII prohibits un-
ions from trying "to cause or attempt to cause" employer discrimination, while section
2000e-(c) (1) bars direct union discrimination).
37 Id. at 688.
38 Id. at 689.
39 Id. at 688-89.
40 Egger v. Local 276, Plumbers and Pipefitters Union, 644 F. Supp. 795, 802 (D.
Mass. 1986), affd, 843 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that a union has an affirmative
duty under Title VII to combat discrimination in the workplace, and a union that
acquiesces in employer discrimination is liable under Title VII).
41 Woods v. Graphic Commc'ns., 925 F.2d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding a
union liable for acquiescing in a racially discriminatory work environment where it
failed to pursue grievances for racial discrimination by an employer).
42 Howard v. Int'l Molders & Allied Workers Union, 779 F.2d 1546, 1552 (11th Cir.
1986) (adopting acquiescence theory of union liability for hostile work environment
discrimination in the workplace).
43 Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the




found that unions have no affirmative duty to remedy workplace
discrimination. It is notable that most of the cases in which the
courts recognized an affirmative union duty to remedy hostile work
environment discrimination involved union members in the con-
struction trades, while those rejecting union liability arose for the
most part in industries where unions had a less active role in the
workplace.
II. EEOC v. PIPEFITIERS ASSOCIATION LocAL 597
The Seventh Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Pipefitters Association
Local 597 is the leading court of appeals decision against union
liability and has been a major setback for women and minority
union members facing discrimination in the construction indus-
try.47 The district court found that Local 597 intentionally acqui-
esced in the employer's discriminatory policy because the union
failed to act in opposition to a racially hostile work environment
despite its policy of addressing workplace conditions even absent a
grievance.48 The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that unions
have no affirmative duty to remedy workplace discrimination and
that union acquiescence in employer discrimination does not vio-
late Title VII.49 Although this holding has been followed in dozens
of subsequent cases involving tradeswomen and minorities expe-
riencing harassment on the job, two recent decisions have distin-
guished the case on both its facts and the law.
A. Background and Lower Court Decision
The case began on a large industrial construction project in
the predominantly African-American town of Robbins, Illinois.
The prime contractor on the project, Foster Wheeler, had a history
44 McCollum v. Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, No. 1:03 CV00355, 2004 WL 595184, at
*7 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 10, 2004) (holding that union acquiescence is not sufficient to
establish union liability for workplace discrimination but that unions must instead
instigate or actively support discriminatory acts of the employer).
45 Thorn v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 305 F.3d 826, 832-33 (8th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting acquiescence theory of union liability for employer discrimination and
holding that unions have no affirmative duty to take remedial action against
discrimination).
46 York v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 948, 956-57 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that union did not
breach its duty of fair representation or acquiesce in employer discrimination where it
failed to pursue female engineer's grievance concerning employer's seniority require-
ment in hiring).
47 EEOC v. Pipefitters Ass'n Local Union 597, 334 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2003).
48 EEOC v. Pipefitters Ass'n Local 597, 92 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 349, 358-59
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2002), rev'd, 334 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2003).
49 Local Union 597, 334 F.3d at 661-63.
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of racially discriminatory practices. Foster Wheeler reached an
agreement with the city that local residents would be hired on the
project, including a number of African-American pipefitters from
Local 597.50 This victory was short-lived because, from the day they
arrived on the job and throughout their employment at the Foster
Wheeler project, the African-American pipefitters were confronted
with a racially hostile work environment. Some of the incidents
involved portable toilets reserved for the pipefitters covered with
racially offensive graffiti;5 ' a swastika placed in an African-Ameri-
can's pipefitter's toolbox; 52 a Ku Klux Klan poster displayed in the
trailer used by pipefitters for breaks; and a hangman's noose
strung up over the door by a fellow union member and Foster
Wheeler foreman.
53
Although racial discrimination was barred by the collective
bargaining agreement with the employer, Local 597 had no written
procedure for dealing with racial discrimination complaints, and it
provided no racial harassment training for any of its members or
lead pipefitters.54 James Ferguson, an African-American pipefitter
50 Local 597, 92 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 352. Local 597 has a long and ugly
history of discrimination against its African-American members, particularly in job
referrals. In 1974, the union entered into a consent decree in which it agreed to no
longer discriminate on the basis of race in the operation of its hiring hall. Daniels v.
Pipefitters Ass'n Local Union 597, 113 F.3d 685, 686 (7th Cir. 1997). In 1988, Frank
Daniels, an African-American pipefitter who was expelled from the union after re-
sisting discriminatory job referrals, successfully brought suit pursuant to Title VII and
42 U.S.C. § 1981, a civil rights statute that prohibits discrimination in the making and
enforcement of contracts. Daniels v. Pipefitters Ass'n Local Union 597, 945 F.2d 906,
922-26 (7th Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, the union stubbornly refused to comply with
the court order, and it ultimately took an additional seven years before Frank Daniels
was able to win reinstatement into his union. Local Union 597, 113 F.3d at 688. In all,
Frank Daniels was unable to work in his trade for thirteen years due to his expulsion
from the union. Id. at 686-87.
51 Portable toilets are one of the few common spaces shared by workers in the
construction industry, and their condition is a strong indicator of company and union
attitudes towards women and minorities. Inadequate toilet facilities and racially or
sexually explicit graffiti convey the message that women and minority workers are not
welcome and that discrimination will be tolerated on thejobsite. See generally Brief for
Legal Momentum as Amicus Curiae supporting Petitioner-Appellant in Hernandez v.
HCH Miller Park Joint Venture, 418 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-3615), available
at http://www.legalmomentum.org/issues/nontrad/HernandezAmicus.pdf (arguing
trial court erred in excluding evidence of sexually explicit graffiti and pornography
on work-site as irrelevant to sex discrimination claim against employer); Susan Eisen-
berg, Bucket or Bathroom ?, in WE'LL CALL IF WE NEED You, supra note 1, at 123 (com-
menting on the construction industry's failure to accommodate the needs of female
workers).
52 Local 597, 92 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 353.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 355.
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who had endured the harassment for several months, finally com-
plained to Steve Toth, a union business agent, and Dennis Hahney,
piping superintendent for Foster Wheeler and union shop steward,
when he found racially harassing graffiti directed toward both him
and his wife.55 Hahney had been aware of the graffiti, the noose,
and the swastika for months, but took no action to correct it until
Ferguson spoke up.56 In response to Ferguson's request, Hahney
asked another foreman to paint over the graffiti in the port-a-
johns, but he did nothing to prevent or remove additional racially
hostile graffiti that appeared in the following months.
On the Foster Wheeler worksite, Hahney was in charge of hir-
ing, firing, and supervision of pipefitters in his capacity as superin-
tendent for the contractor, but as a union shop steward, he was
also responsible for ensuring that the union collective bargaining
agreement was enforced; the job site was safe for the pipefitters;
and "no one was 'hassled"' at work.5 ' The union business agent
Steve Toth visited the site regularly to ensure the collective bar-
gaining agreement was enforced, and he once reported sexually
offensive grafitti in the port-a-johns, which was later removed by
the employer.
58
After an investigation, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) brought suit against both Foster Wheeler and
Local 597 on behalf of the African-American pipefitters.59 Though
the EEOC settled with Foster Wheeler, it maintained its suit against
Local 597.60 In denying the union's motion for summary judg-
ment, the court held that a union incurred Title VII liability if it
intentionally acquiesced in an employer's hostile work environ-
ment discrimination.61 The court adopted the intentional acquies-
cence standard, rejecting the higher standard requiring
instigation, support, ratification, or encouragement, which is used
to determine union liability under the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act.6 2 Citing Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., the court held that a
union is liable under Title VII where its officials are aware of but
55 Id. at 354.
56 Id. at 354-55.
57 Id. at 354.
58 Id.
59 EEOC v. Pipefitters Ass'n Local Union 597, 334 F.3d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 2003).
60 Id.
61 EEOC v. Foster Wheeler Constructors, Inc., Nos. 98 C 1601, 98 C 3217, 1999 WL
507191, at *9 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 1999).
62 Id. at *7; see, e.g., Cole v. Appalachian Power Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1730-31 (S.D.W. Va. May 19, 1995) (rejecting employer's claim against union for
breach of nondiscrimination clause where "there is no allegation that the union di-
20061
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ignore racial discrimination in the workplace.63
Following a bench trial, the district court found Hahney had
both actual and apparent authority as an agent of Local 597 in his
role as shop steward at the Foster Wheeler job site. 64 Additionally,
as shop steward, Hahney acted to enforce the union collective bar-
gaining agreement and ensure workplace safety even where there
had been no complaints by union members. 65 The court also dis-
posed of the union's argument that racial graffiti was so common-
place on construction sites that Hahney and other union officials
did not realize it was offensive:
Only a visitor from another planet would fail to understand the
ugliness of what was written and drawn on those walls. To credit
the testimony that Hahney, Toth, Jordan and others failed to
understand that the graffiti was offensive to any African Ameri-
can pipe fitters would require an extraordinary level of naivete
66or cynicism.
Based on these findings, the court concluded that Local 597
violated Title VII by intentionally acquiescing in the racially hostile
work environment at the Foster Wheeler job site. 67 The district
court awarded both compensatory and punitive damages to the
plaintiffs, and it ordered injunctive relief to prevent future racial
discrimination by the union.68 The court permanently enjoined
the union from permitting a racially hostile work environment at
any job site and required notice posting at the union hall along
with individual mailings to all union members. 69 Additionally, the
union was ordered to create a written policy against racial harass-
ment, including a complaint procedure, and to develop a racial
harassment training program required for all union members.7 °
B. Court of Appeals Decision
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.71 Judge Pos-
ner, writing for the majority, held that the union had no affirma-
rected, induced, authorized or ratified any acts of sexual harassment or that any of
the alleged harassers acted under express or apparent authority as a union agent").
63 Foster Wheeler, 1999 WL 507191 at *9.
64 EEOC v. Pipefitters Ass'n Local 597, 92 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 349, 358-59
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2002), rev'd, 334 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2003).
65 Id. at 354.
66 Id. at 356.
67 Id. at 358-59.
68 Id. at 359-60.
69 Id. at 359.
70 Id. at 360.
71 Local Union 597, 334 F.3d at 663.
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tive duty to remedy hostile work environment discrimination,72 nor
was it liable for "selective inaction" in the face of workplace dis-
crimination.7" Judge Posner, citing both practical and statutory dif-
ferences between unions and employers, made a sharp distinction
between the respective roles and responsibilities of unions and em-
ployers regarding workplace discrimination.7 ' He also identified
and discussed four categories of selective union inaction in an at-
tempt to distinguish Local 597 from Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.75
Judge Posner argued that, as a practical matter, unions should
not be liable for workplace discrimination because they are in a far
worse position than employers to remedy such discrimination.76
Generally, union officials have no power to compel an employer to
remedy or prevent discrimination against its members;77 addition-
ally, the union cannot discipline workers who discriminate, particu-
larly when those workers are not union members.78 Judge Posner
asserted that union members experiencing workplace discrimina-
tion can still recover full relief from the employer.7 9
Judge Posner also argued that unions and employers have dif-
ferent nondiscrimination responsibilities in the workplace under
Title VII. The provision prohibiting a union from otherwise dis-
criminating against its members ° applies only to the union's func-
tion as the workers' agent in dealing with the employer.8 While
employers have the affirmative duty to ensure that hostile work en-
vironment discrimination is not permitted,8 2 unions have no simi-
lar obligation. 3 Judge Posner concluded that, since unions have
neither the duty nor the power to remedy workplace discrimina-
tion, the pipefitters' complaint about the racially hostile graffiti at
the job site was addressed to Hahney as company foreman, not
union shop steward.8"
72 Id. at 661.
73 Id. at 663.
74 Id. at 659-61.
75 Id. at 661-62.




80 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (c) (1) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for a labor organization (1) . . .to exclude or to expel from its membership, or other-
wise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ... .") (emphasis added).
81 Local Union 597, 334 F.3d at 659.
82 Id. at 658.
83 Id. at 660.
84 Id.
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Finally, Judge Posner dismissed the theory that Local 597 vio-
lated Title VII through selective inaction amounting to intentional
acquiescence in workplace discrimination. 5 After identifying four
possible types of selective inaction-two of which clearly violate Ti-
de VII and two of which do not-Judge Posner held that this case
fell within the latter category.8 6 Specifically, a union is liable where
it makes a policy of grieving the complaints of white workers but
not those of African-American workers, and where a union refuses
to pursue racial grievances due to employer hostility to such com-
plaints.8 7 However, there is no union liability where a union ref-
uses to grieve all discrimination complaints because it would
complicate dealings with an employer, and where a union re-
sponds passively to racial discrimination but proactively to other
workplace problems.8 8 Echoing Justice Powell's dissent in Good-
man,8 1 Judge Posner argued that a union may have legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for choosing to address some forms of
workplace discrimination but not others. For example, "uneven
remediation of different forms of discrimination may reflect noth-
ing more than a need to determine priorities so that limited re-
sources can be concentrated on the most urgent problems of
discrimination facing a particular employer (or union) at a particu-
lar site at a particular time ... ."90 Judge Posner concluded that
even if selective inaction could be the basis of a Title VII claim
against a union, the facts in this case were insufficient to establish
that Hahney should have acted in the absence of a grievance by the
African-American workers.9 Because the union had no affirmative
duty to remedy workplace discrimination and the plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate selective inaction, Local 597 did not violate Title
VII. 9 2
Writing in dissent, Judge Ilana Diamond Rovner argued that
the majority opinion failed to recognize the degree of control un-
ions may exercise in the workplace.93 She instead advocated for a
standard wherein a union is liable for hostile work environment
discrimination when "the facts reveal that, in practice, the union
85 Id. at 661-63.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 661.
88 Id. at 661-62.
89 Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 688-89 (1987) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
90 Local Union 597, 334 F.3d at 662.
91 Id. at 662-63.
92 Id. at 661-62.
93 Id. at 665 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 10:245
"NOT OUR PROBLEM"
enjoys significant control over working conditions and has the
power to correct workplace inequities," yet fails to do so. 4 To de-
termine a union's degree of authority it is important to consider
not only the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, but also
the actual or apparent authority union officials routinely exercise
on the job site.95
Judge Rovner agreed with the district court that Hahney and
other union officials at the job site established their authority over
the conditions of the port-a-johns by addressing other workplace
issues; thus, their failure to address the racial graffiti in the toilets
constituted intentional acquiescence in the hostile work environ-
ment.96 In addition, the union allowed Hahney to serve as union
shop steward despite the fact that he simultaneously served as a
company foreman, indicating that the union "voluntarily crossed
the boundary separating the company's domain from the
union's."9 7 Judge Rovner also dismissed the majority's argument
that it would be awkward for unions to address workplace discrimi-
nation caused by fellow union members. She noted that disputes
among fellow union members are common, and unions have for
years had the duty to represent both harassers and victims in em-
ployer disciplinary proceedings.
98
C. Impact on Subsequent Cases
Local 597 has been cited by dozens of state and federal courts
for the proposition that unions have no affirmative duty to remedy
workplace discrimination and do not incur Title VII liability for
inaction in the face of workplace discrimination.9 In most of
these cases, courts have dismissed discrimination claims against un-
ions by women and minority construction workers, leaving them
essentially without a remedy and diminishing the role of unions as
workplace advocates for their members.
94 Id. at 663.
95 Id
96 Id. at 664.
97 Id. at 665.
98 Id. at 665 (citing Thorn v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 305 F.3d 826, 833 (8th
Cir. 2002)).
99 See, e.g., Woods v. Ryerson & Son, Inc., No. Civ. 00-2619JNERLE, 2004 WL
1559379, at *1 (D. Minn. July 9, 2004); Copeland v. IBEW Local No. 8, No.
302CV7240, 2005 WL 1353905, at *8 (N.D. Ohio June 7, 2005); Ellison v. Plumbers &
Steam Fitters Union Local 375, 118 P.3d 1070, 1072 (Alaska 2005); Maalik v. Int'l
Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 2, 437 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2006);Jimerson
v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1423, No. Civ.A. CV205-101, 2005 WL 3533044,
at *4 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 2005).
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For example in Woods v. Ryerson & Son, Inc., an African-Ameri-
can steelworker brought suit against his union for acquiescing in
racial harassment by other union members.' 00 Union members
made racially derogatory comments to Woods and disseminated a
union pamphlet that contained racially and sexually offensive
cartoons." 1 In rejecting Woods' claim, the trial court cited Local
597, holding that unions have no affirmative duty to remedy hostile
work environment discrimination. 10 2 In Copeland v. IBEW Local No.
8, the court held that a union's failure to process a grievance for an
African-American electrician experiencing hostile work environ-
ment racial discrimination did not violate Title VII in part because
the union had no affirmative duty to remedy workplace
discrimination. 
10 3
Local 597 has also had an effect on cases involving hostile work
environment sex discrimination. In Ellison v. Plumbers & Steam Fit-
ters Union Local 375, the Alaska Supreme Court rejected a claim by
a female pipefitter that her union discriminated against her by fail-
ing to address a sexually hostile work environment. 0 4 Fellow
union members covered Ellison's work area and the port-a-johns
with threatening sexual graffiti, posted altered pictures of her at
the job site, and displayed tampons and "cramp pills."'0 5 Though
Ellison complained repeatedly to her shop stewards and to a com-
pany foreman who was also a union member, they encouraged her
to keep the problem within the union and not file a complaint with
the company. 10 6 Relying on Local 597 for the proposition that
union acquiescence in an employer's discrimination is not suffi-
cient to establish Title VII liability, the Supreme Court of Alaska
upheld the dismissal of Ellison's claim and the award of substantial
attorney's fees to the union.1
0 7
As these cases demonstrate, many unions in the construction
trades, relying on Local 597, have relinquished their traditional
role as advocates for members against racial or sexual discrimina-
tion in the workplace. At best, the union response can be viewed
as passive indifference to a problem that is essentially between the
worker and the employer. However, if-as is typical in the con-
100 Woods, 2004 WL 1559379, at *1.
101 Id.
102 Id. at *3.
103 Copeland, 2005 WL 1353905, at *8.
104 Ellison, 118 P.3d at 1072.
105 Id. at 1072.
106 Id. at 1077.
107 Id. at 1075, 1078.
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struction industry-union members first look to their union for as-
sistance and leadership in dealing with workplace discrimination,
Local 597 makes it particularly difficult for those union members to
get relief.
Recognizing these problems, courts in two recent cases involv-
ing female plaintiffs working in non-traditional trades have distin-
guished Local 597 and limited the impact of the case for union
members. In Maalik v. International Union of Elevator Constructors,
Local 2, the Seventh Circuit limited the applicability of Local 597 by
holding a union responsible for workplace discrimination under a
separate provision of Title VII.' s Judge Easterbrook, writing for a
unanimous Seventh Circuit panel, overturned a district court hold-
ing that only employers were liable for workplace discrimina-
tion.' O In that case, Safiyyah Maalik, an African-American elevator
worker, was denied certification as a mechanic after senior
mechanics refused to provide her with on-the-job training because
of her race and gender.10° Though the union could have either
disciplined its members through fines and suspensions or certified
Maalik on the basis of her classroom training, it refused to do so."'
Citing Local 597, the union claimed that workplace discrimination
was the sole responsibility of the employer, and the district court
agreed.' 12 While not directly challenging its holding in Local 597,
the Seventh Circuit held that Maalik's union violated a separate
provision of Title VII prohibiting discrimination by unions or em-
ployers in the administration of apprenticeship programs.' 1
Taking another approach in Jimerson v. International Longshore-
men's Association, Local 1423, the Southern District of Georgia dis-
tinguished Local 597 on its facts. "4 In denying the union's motion
to dismiss, the court held that a union may be held liable under
Title VII if it has a "sufficient connection with a discriminatory
practice.""' 5  In that case, Rhonda Jimerson, a female African-
108 Maalik v. Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 2, 437 F.3d 650, 653 (7th
Cir. 2006) (basing union liability on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d), which governs joint train-
ing and apprenticeship programs, rather than 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c), which ad-
dresses a union's liability in carrying out its agency function).
109 Id. at 654.
110 Id. at 651.
111 Id. at 653.
112 Id. at 652.
113 Id. at 653.
114 Jimerson v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1423, No. Civ.A. CV205-101, 2005
WL 3533044, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 2005).
115 Id. at *5.
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American longshoreman116 in Georgia, alleged that she was regu-
larly sexually harassed by her supervisors and fellow union mem-
bers and that the harassment continued despite repeated
complaints to her union.' 17 Jimerson's union was responsible for
the discipline and supervision of union members at the work
site. a"" Additionally, the union president repeatedly told its mem-
bers that the union controlled hiring.1 9 The court held that these
facts, if proven, could demonstrate a sufficient connection with
Jimerson's experience of discrimination to hold the union lia-
ble. 120 The Jimerson court thus limited the impact of Local 597 by
focusing its analysis on the relationship between union authority in
the workplace and the subject of the hostile environment discrimi-
nation complaint.
III. ANALysis AND CRITIQUE OF LoCAL 597
This Section will argue that the standard for union liability for
hostile work environment discrimination under Title VII as articu-
lated in Local 597 is inadequate to prevent and remedy discrimina-
tion in the construction industry. The decision fails to recognize
the historical pervasiveness of hostile work environment racial and
sexual harassment in the construction industry and the authority
that many unions exercise in the workplace today. Local 597 is also
out of harmony with the remedial purpose of Title VII because it
leaves many workers in the construction trades without a remedy.
A. Hostile Work Environment Discrimination in the Construction
Trades
The Posner decision fails to appreciate the pervasiveness of
racial discrimination on construction sites, as well as the role of
unions in fostering and perpetuating workplace harassment of wo-
men and minorities. Local 597 gives unions, many of which already
view women and minority members as trespassers, further incen-
tive to discount their particular interests at the work site. This only
116 Longshoremen, also known as stevedores, load and unload cargo from ships.
There are significant similarities between the work of longshoremen and construction
workers with respect to the nature of the work, the composition of the workforce, the
structure of the maritime industry, and the role of unions. For an examination of
employment discrimination in the maritime industry, see Yesenia Gallegos, Sexual
Harassment of Female Crewmembers: Title VIi's Weaknesses in Protecting Women Employed in
the Maritime Industry, 15 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 455 (2002-2003).
117 fimerson, 2005 WL 3533044, at *1.
118 Id.




compounds the difficulty many union members in the construc-
tion industry already face in addressing workplace sex and race
discrimination.
Sexual harassment is almost universal in the construction in-
dustry. According to a study by the Chicago Women in the Trades,
88% of women working in the construction trades reported pic-
tures of naked or partially dressed women on the job; 83% exper-
ienced unwelcome sexual remarks at work; and 80% complained
that their job site had either no toilets or dirty toilets.121 Elaine
Ward, a female journeyman plumber in New York, described her
union's attitude towards workplace discrimination as follows:
I would go to jobs and the Business Agents were, to put it quite
bluntly, very hostile. And the more persistent I was, the more
they made it clear that they were not going to do too much to
help me and that it didn't matter what the laws were. It didn't
matter if the jobs were supposed to have women on them. The
contractors are not responsible to the union hall. And the of-
ficers in the union are not responsible directly to the members.
This is what happens in practice.'
22
The testimony of union officials in Local 597 indicates that ra-
cial harassment is just as widespread. The union presented evi-
dence at trial that racially hostile graffiti was common on all
construction sites in order to support its argument that conditions
on the Foster Wheeler site were typical and did not violate Title
VII. 12' Foster Wheeler agents also testified that, in their years of
construction experience, they knew of no effective method to elim-
inate racially hostile graffiti from construction sites.124 The district
court judge in Local 597 dismissed both of these arguments, noting
that the law is effective in deterring racist conduct, even among
bigoted employees.' 25 Yet the reversal by the Seventh Circuit
means that unions no longer have any responsibility or incentive to
address discrimination against or by their members at work.
Additionally, the source of harassment is often fellow union
members who resent the intrusion of women and minority workers
121 CHICAGO WOMEN IN THE TRADES, BUILDING EQUAL. OPPORTUNITY: Six AFFIRMA-
TIVE AcTION PROGRAMS FOR WOMEN CONSTRUCTION WORKERS 6 (1995).
122 Jane Latour, Live! From New York: Women Construction Workers in Their Own Words,
42 LABOR HISTORY 179, 185 (2001).
123 EEOC v. Pipefitters Ass'n Local 597, 92 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 349, 356
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2002), rev'd, 334 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2003) ("In defense of its inac-
tion, Local 597 argued that racial graffiti was common on all construction sites and
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into unions historically composed solely of white males. Union cul-
ture in the construction trades is often based on a legacy of racism
and sexism. 126 Large numbers of union leaders, business agents,
and shop stewards today are sons, nephews, and grandsons of prior
union members who proudly celebrate the glory days of past union
events, many of which occurred when women and minorities were
barred from union membership. 127 Consequently minority work-
ers and women are viewed as less-qualified trespassers, whose rela-
tively recent entry into the trade unions was the result of
government coercion. 28  The response a female carpenter re-
ceived when she was seeking work early in her career sums up the
attitude of many unions towards affirmative action programs: "We
had the coloreds forced down our throats in the '60s and we'll be
damned if we have the chicks forced down our throats in the
'70s."129
Finally, unions themselves often make it harder for members
to speak up about harassment, and many women and minorities
are forced to resort to informal means to remedy workplace dis-
crimination. Courts have been reluctant to hold unions responsi-
ble for selective inaction in the absence of a formal grievance by
union members experiencing discrimination.1 3  However, many
union members in the construction trades have no access to formal
grievance procedures;13 ' are strongly discouraged from using them
by union officials;1"2 or know that the grievance procedure will be
ineffective because union officials or senior union members are
126 See Marion Crain, Women, Labor Unions, and Hostile Work Environment Sexual Har-
assment: The Untold Story, 4 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 9, 30 n.95 (1995).
127 See generally Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, "Labor's Divided Ranks:" Privilege and
the United Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1542 (1999) (arguing that union denial of
the increasingly diverse working class is counterproductive to the solidarity ideal
among workers).
128 See Sylvia A. Law, "Girls Can't be Plumbers"--Affirmative Action Programs for Women
in Construction: Beyond Goals and Quotas, 24 IHt-v. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 45, 48-55 (1989).
129 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 33.
130 See, e.g., EEOC v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local 109, 88 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 894 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 2000) (granting summary judgment for union in sex
discrimination claim where plaintiff never filed a formal grievance with the union).
131 See, e.g., Copeland v. IBEW Local No. 8, No. 302CV7240, 2005 WL 1353905, at
*7 (N.D. Ohio June 7, 2005) (holding that a union had no duty to address workplace
discrimination against a black union member because the union's collective bargain-
ing agreement with the employer contained no nondiscrimination provision).
132 See, e.g.,Jimerson v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1423, No. Civ.A. CV205-
101, 2005 WL 3533044, at *10 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 2005) (finding that union officials
encouraged Jimerson not to pursue her sexual harassment complaint, promised the




the source of the harassment.133
Instead, union members often use informal means, such as
complaints to union officials, to address workplace discrimination
because of the nonexistence or unavailability of grievance proce-
dures. For instance, Local 597 had no formal grievance procedure
for union members to report discrimination on the job site, even
though there was a nondiscrimination clause in the collective bar-
gaining agreement.134 Additionally, many union members find it
difficult to get a copy of either the collective bargaining agreement
governing the relationship between the union and the employer or
their local union constitution and by-laws, which set out the struc-
ture of the union and often contain the formal grievance
procedure.1
35
Even where workers have access to and understand their
union's grievance procedure, shop stewards, business agents, and
other union officials often discourage filing of formal grievances
about workplace discrimination. By warning the members that a
complaint would antagonize the employers, or that a complainant
will not be believed or taken seriously, unions succeed more often
than not in persuading members experiencing discrimination not
to file formal grievances.
13 6
There are many reasons why a union may discourage members
from filing discrimination claims. For instance, similar to Goodman
v. Lukens Steel Co., a union may argue that such claims will only
antagonize employers.'37 Union officials may also believe that
dealing with the problem informally is more effective. Addition-
ally, where fellow union members are the source of the harass-
ment, the unions may seek to protect the harassers from workplace
133 See id. at *3.
134 EEOC v. Pipefitters Ass'n Local 597, 92 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 349, 355
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2002), revd, 334 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2003).
135 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 104, 29 U.S.C.
§ 414 (2000) (guaranteeing union members access to their collective bargaining
agreement and constitution and by-laws). Nevertheless, in the Author's experience at
Legal Momentum's Women Rebuild Project, tradeswomen often reported hostility
from unions when requesting either document. Union officials demanded to know
why they were requesting the documents and whether they were planning to file a
lawsuit-they were warned that they could be blacklisted if they did so. See generally
http://www.legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/programs/equalityworks/ trades
women/.
136 Crain & Matheny, supra note 127, at 34.
137 482 U.S. 656, 669 (1987) (holding that union violated Title VII where it acqui-
esced in employer discrimination and failed to process grievances of African-Ameri-
can union members claiming racial discrimination because of employer hostility to
such claims).
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disciplinary proceedings. For example, in Ellison v. Plumbers and
Steamfitters Union Local 375, a female plumber who was sexually
harassed at work by fellow union members was urged by a shop
steward and company foreman, who was also a union member, to
keep the issue within the union by accepting an apology from the
harasser and agreeing not to complain to company
management. 13
8
When the shop steward or other senior union members are
the source of the harassment, union members are often reluctant
to use formal grievance procedures, anticipating the procedure
will be ineffective. This situation is similar to Meritor, where the
company harassment complaint procedure required the victim to
report to the harasser.13 9 In such cases, it is unreasonable to re-
quire union members to file formal grievances because of the de-
creased likelihood that the complaint will be taken seriously and
the real risk of retaliation faced by the victim of discrimination.
Evan Ruderman, a female electrician in New York City, described
her fear of speaking up and confronting her union about work-
place discrimination:
It's always perplexed me how, in the face of such blatant sexual
harassment on such a daily basis, we never went to court. We
followed legal channels to get women in, to fight for bathroom
and changing facilities, for all these things, but we never did a
class action sexual harassment suit. And why? We were scared
of being blacklisted. We were scared of the fact that we had
really put ourselves out there. I think that most of us who had
been in the trades, and really hung our necks out, we were really
beginning to also suffer from the effects of that.'4 °
Overall, Local 597 fails to recognize the pervasiveness of ra-
cially and sexually hostile work environments in the construction
industry and the role of labor unions in perpetuating workplace
discrimination against women and minorities. By insulating un-
ions from liability for workplace discrimination, the decision gives
unions no incentive to represent the interests of minority and wo-
men workers experiencing hostile environment discrimination,
even where the union serves as an active workplace advocate on
other issues.
138 Ellison v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Union Local 375, 118 P.3d 1070, 1072
(Alaska 2005).
139 MeNtor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71 (1986) (noting that bank's
grievance policy required employees to first report harassment to a supervisor who, in
this case, was the alleged harasser).
140 Latour, supra note 122, at 184.
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B. Remedial Purpose of Title VII
When Judge Posner noted in Local 597 that women and mi-
nority workers facing workplace discrimination were not left with-
out a remedy, he was referring primarily to the availability of
money damages from an employer. 4' Equitable relief is some of
the most powerful relief a victim of discrimination can receive
under Title VII, but due to the temporary nature of employment in
the construction industry, such relief is often unavailable or inef-
fective from discriminatory employers. Even compensatory dam-
ages are often not a sufficient remedy because those damages are
reduced where employment is short-term. On the other hand, eq-
uitable remedies like those awarded by the trial court against Local
597 can be very successful in preventing and addressing workplace
discrimination in the construction industry. The lack of meaning-
ful remedies under Local 597 thus undermines the effectiveness of
Tide VII in the construction industry because the statute is en-
forced primarily through suits by individual plaintiffs.
The primary purpose of Title VII is to prevent workplace dis-
crimination, not to compensate victims of discrimination.' 42 For
this reason, courts have broad equitable authority to order reme-
dies, such as harassment training and notice posting, and to moni-
tor compliance.' 43 The preventative goal of Title VII was also an
important consideration for the Supreme Court in the creation of
the affirmative defense for employers who develop a reasonable
141 EEOC v. Pipefitters Ass'n Local Union 597, 334 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2003)
("Since the employer is both fully liable for failing to take effective measures against
coworker harassment and far better positioned to apply such measures, what is to be
gained, except litigation clutter, by imposing the same liability on the union?").
142 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998). Title VII seeks "to
make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment dis-
crimination, its 'primary objective', like that of any statute meant to influence primary
conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid harm." Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)).
143 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006).
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in
the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, rein-
statement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by
the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case
may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any
other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate ....
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nondiscrimination policy.1 44  Nondiscrimination policies have
been successful in changing discriminatory conduct in white-collar
work environments; 145 they can also go a long way in changing
workplace conduct and eliminating discrimination in the blue-col-
lar construction industry.
In the construction trades, the vast majority ofjobs are tempo-
rary, though the average length of employment varies by trade, re-
gion, employer, season, and even by worker. For instance,
plumbers working temporary heat jobs146 in the winter may be dis-
patched to a different employer every week, though they work with
the same union members and face similar job conditions at every
site. On the other hand, it is not uncommon for a journeyman
carpenter to find a job with a single employer and travel with him
or her from project to project for years.
The journeyman carpenter with steady work will have a strong
incentive to speak up about discrimination on the job because she
has a strong stake in the employment, and there are meaningful
remedies available. If she seeks compensatory damages, they will
be substantial, based on the length of her employment and her
future job prospects with the employer. Additionally, equitable re-
lief from the employer-such as notice posting, a nondiscrimina-
tion grievance procedure, and harassment training-would
improve her working conditions with the employer. There is still
the risk that this worker could face retaliation from her employer
for speaking up, but an employer's claim that she was fired for
nondiscriminatory reasons, such as a work slowdown, would be less
credible given her long employment with the company.
In contrast, for the plumber working temporary heat jobs, a
successful discrimination claim against any one employer would re-
sult in very low compensatory damages and ineffective equitable
144 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 766
(1998).
145 See Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne L. Rapp, Are We There Yet? Forty Years After the
Passage of the Civil Rights Act: Revolution in the Workforce and the Unfulfilled Promises that
Remain, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 627, 664-67 (2005) (arguing that the develop-
ment of the affirmative defense has improved the effectiveness of Title VII in prevent-
ing discrimination by encouraging employers to develop reasonable
nondiscrimination policies on their own initiative). But see Martha S. West, Preventing
Sexual Harassment: The Federal Courts' Wake-Up Call for Women, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 457,
460 (2002) (arguing that courts should require employers, not employees, to bear the
burden of demonstrating the effectiveness of workplace nondiscrimination policies).
146 In the winter, construction contractors often hire plumbers to set up rudimen-
tary heating systems to warm the job site while a project is being completed. Because
they last only a short duration, temporary heat jobs are among the least desired as-
signments for plumbers and pipefitters.
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relief. The compensatory damages would be low because ajob lasts
only one or two weeks at most. Equitable relief such as notice post-
ing, harassment training, and the creation of a nondiscrimination
policy would be meaningless, particularly if the source of the har-
assment is a fellow union member. By the time any claim is suc-
cessfully asserted, the project may be complete, the job site may no
longer exist, and the victim of discrimination will have moved on to
dozens of other employers, as will the harasser. Neither the victim
nor the harasser will see the employer's notice posting or benefit
from the harassment training or nondiscrimination policy. Even if
this worker decided to speak up, there is an increased risk of retali-
ation from the employer. Unlike the carpenter with steady employ-
ment, an employer under these circumstances could more credibly
defend a layoff by arguing that the project was coming to an end
and the layoff was inevitable.
On the other hand, if a plumber could bring a suit against her
union for selective inaction in failing to address the workplace dis-
crimination, it is more likely that she could receive meaningful re-
lief in the long term. Requiring discriminatory unions to formu-
late nondiscrimination grievance procedures, post notices in the
union hall, and provide harassment training for union members,
agents, and foremen 147 would improve working conditions for wo-
men and minorities in the construction industry by making it eas-
ier and more worthwhile to speak out about discrimination. 4 '
The lack of meaningful remedies for many workers facing dis-
crimination in the construction industry under Local 597 means
that most of those workers will decide not to pursue their work-
place rights, and the pattern of workplace discrimination will be
perpetuated. In weighing the risk of bringing a suit to assert their
workplace rights, many will decide that it is not worth the trouble,
147 See, e.g., EEOC v. Foster Wheeler Constructors, 92 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
349, 359-60 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2002) (awarding injunctive relief against the union
including notice posting, requiring union to develop written racial harassment non-
discrimination policy and grievance procedure, and ordering regular compliance re-
ports), rev'd, 334 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2003).
148 In her essay Marking Gender Boundaries: Porn, Piss, Power Tools, master electrician
Susan Eisenberg describes her experience of the impact of acquiescence in the face of
workplace discrimination:
The effect of a harasser's action was compounded when others on the
job knew about it but did not intervene-as though he were acting on
their behalf. Contractors and unions tended to underestimate the grav-
ity of harassment and in some instances even condoned the behavior,
tacitly or explicitly. Institutional procedures for prevention or punish-
ment were rare.
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 77.
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expense, and risk of retaliation from both the union and the em-
ployer to bring a suit that will provide limited compensation and
have no impact on future discrimination. Not only are workers re-
luctant to bring such claims, but private attorneys are also less
likely to represent such workers because the payout from successful
suits is so low.
Local 597 thus undermines the effectiveness of Title VII by pre-
cluding the pursuit of equitable remedies from unions that perpet-
uate hostile work environment discrimination. Though equitable
remedies are often meaningless when applied to an employer, they
can have a powerful impact in the union hall. Nevertheless, Local
597 forecloses the availability of injunctive relief even from unions
that close their eyes to workplace race and sex discrimination of
their members. As a result, workplace discrimination in the con-
struction trades is perpetuated, rather than deterred.
IV. HOLDING UNIONS ACCOUNTABLE FOR HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT DISCRiMINATION UNDER TITLE VII
This Section advocates for the standard of union liability pro-
posed by Judge Rovner in Local 597149 and applied in Jimerson,15 °
which looks to the degree of workplace control exercised by a
union in determining Title VII liability. This Section will first dis-
cuss the legal standard courts should consider in holding a union
responsible for workplace discrimination as well as the benefits of
this standard for unionized workers in the construction industry.
Addressing possible criticism, this Section argues that unions in the
construction industry should embrace their role as workplace advo-
cates for members experiencing discrimination.
A. Union Liability for Hostile Work Environment Discrimination
A union which is aware of hostile work environment discrimi-
nation against its members, but fails to attempt to remedy that dis-
crimination, should be liable under Title VII where that failure is
unreasonable and the union exercises a sufficient degree of con-
trol over the workplace. Under this standard, not every union has
an affirmative duty to combat workplace discrimination; instead
courts look to the degree of control the union assumed over terms
149 EEOC v. Pipefitters Ass'n Local Union 597, 334 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Rovner, J., dissenting).
150 Jimerson v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1423, 2005 WL 3533044, at *1-3
(S.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 2005).
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and conditions of employment in the workplace-particularly its
ability to remedy the discriminatory conduct at issue.
1. Workplace Authority: Did the Union Have the Authority
to Prevent the Discriminatory Conduct?
In deciding whether a union is liable for workplace discrimina-
tion, courts should first examine the degree of control the union
exercises over the workplace, focusing in particular on the relation-
ship between union control and the subject of the discrimination
complaint. Some important factors indicating union control in-
clude responsibility for hiring, firing, supervision, workplace train-
ing, and discipline. Courts should also consider whether other
remedies exist, including an effective employer nondiscrimination
policy.
In determining whether these factors are present in any given
case, an important starting point is the union's collective bargain-
ing agreement, which sets out the respective responsibilities of
each party. Other key documents are the union's own constitution
and by-laws, which outline the structure of the union, the responsi-
bilities of union officers, and the grievance procedure for its mem-
bers. However, a court's inquiry should not be confined to these
documents because, as Judge Rover noted, "Authority is not always
conveyed formally . . . and we should not close our eyes to the
realities of the workplace, particularly in the view of the broad re-
medial purposes of Title VII ....
Factors indicating control were important considerations for
the Jimerson court, which denied a union's motion for summary
judgment because the union had the power to prevent and remedy
the discriminatory conduct.1 5 2 Rhonda Jimerson had been sexu-
ally harassed for more than a year by her fellow union members
and supervisors despite repeated complaints to the union. 1 3 In
holding that the union could be liable for its failure to act, the
court noted that the union had the power under its constitution,
by-laws, and collective bargaining agreement to discipline its mem-
bers for sexual harassment. 154 Also important was the fact that
Jimerson's union-and not her employers-were responsible for
hiring, firing, supervision, and discipline on the job. 55 Because
151 Local Union 597, 334 F.3d at 663 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
152 Jimerson, 2005 WL 3533044, at *10.
153 Id. at *1-3.
154 Id. at *4.
155 Id. at *5 ("Jimerson asserts that the union acts as the functional equivalent of an
employer, given that Local 1423 members work for various shipping companies, but
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the union had the authority to remedy the conduct that was the
subject of Jimerson's complaint but failed to do so, the court held
that the union could be liable.
2. Notice: Should the Union Have Been Aware of the
Discriminatory Conduct?
Even where a union exercises a significant degree of control
over the workplace, the union must have notice of the discrimina-
tory conduct in order to incur Title VII liability. When the source
of the discrimination is an agent of the union, such as a union
officer, and the discrimination results in tangible adverse action,
the notice requirement has been satisfied.' 56 Additionally, the
union has actual notice of the source of discrimination where the
victim files a formal grievance complaining of discrimination.
However, as discussed previously, formal complaints are rare for
two reasons: First, few construction unions have written procedures
to deal with race or sex harassment; second, many union members
are reluctant to speak up both because they fear it will be futile and
because they do not wish to be labeled a troublemaker.' 57
Given the rarity of formal union grievances for race and sex
harassment in the construction industry, notice to the union is usu-
ally composed of either an informal complaint or constructive no-
tice. Constructive notice is satisfied where the victim of
discrimination can demonstrate that the union either knew or
should have known of the discriminatory conduct.15 Notice seems
to present a unique hurdle for union members facing workplace
discrimination in the construction industry. The fimerson court
noted that a "union may have constructive notice of harassment
when it occurs daily, in the presence of others, including manage-
ment or other responsible officials in the organization." '159 How-
ever, unlike an employer, union officers and management are not
always present at the workplace. Union officials such as business
agents, who are responsible for enforcing the terms of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement with the employer, may only visit the
workplace on a weekly or monthly basis. Nevertheless, in order to
maintain a strong connection between the union leadership and
the work site, most construction unions appoint shop stewards to
only for one union, and that the union president Hill informs members on a regular
basis that the union controls hiring, not the employers.").
156 Id. at *8.
157 See supra Section III, Part A.




each work site and instruct members to address their workplace
complaints to that individual. In determining whether notice has
been satisfied in any particular case, courts should carefully ex-
amine the leadership structure of the union to determine whether
union agents knew or should have known of the discriminatory
conduct at issue.
3. Affirmative Defense: Did the Union Develop a
Reasonable Procedure to Address Workplace
Discrimination?
The affirmative defense gives unions a strong incentive to take
a proactive approach to discrimination by carefully crafting a rea-
sonable nondiscrimination policy and complaint procedure for its
members. Under this defense developed by the Supreme Court in
Faragher and ELerth, where there has been no adverse employment
action taken against the victim of harassment, the union may pre-
vail if it can demonstrate that it "exercised reasonable care to pre-
vent and correct promptly" the harassing conduct, 160 and the
union member "acted unreasonably in failing to avail herself of the
union's preventive and corrective opportunities."' 6 ' If a union
member experiencing discrimination unreasonably fails to invoke
the complaint procedure, the union is shielded from liability pro-
vided that the policy is "reasonably calculated to encourage victims
of harassment to come forward."1 6 2 In Meitor, the Supreme Court
found that a policy was not reasonable where the victim was re-
quired to report the harassment to her immediate supervisor, and
the policy failed to mention sex discrimination. 163 Similarly, the
fimerson court held that the victim's failure to file a formal griev-
ance was not unreasonable because she had complained repeatedly
to union officials who laughed at her and urged her to drop her
160 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (holding that an em-
ployer is vicariously liable for the sexual harassment of a supervisor under Title VII,
but employer may raise the affirmative defense that it used reasonable efforts to cor-
rect the conduct or that the employee's conduct in avoiding harassment was not rea-
sonable) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)
(applying agency principles in holding an employer may be vicariously liable for the
hostile work environment of a supervisor where the employer made no reasonable
efforts to correct the conduct, and the employee's conduct in avoiding harassment
was reasonable)).
161 Id.
162 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
163 Id. at 72. See also Frederick v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1313
(11th Cir. 2001) (holding that non-compliance with an internal grievance procedure
is reasonable under certain circumstances).
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complaint, stating that they would take care of the problem.'6 4
The widespread creation and adoption of effective nondis-
crimination policies and procedures by unions in the construction
industry would be a welcome development. Currently, many un-
ions in the construction industry have altogether failed to develop
any policies to address race or sexual harassment, choosing instead
to leave victims of workplace discrimination to fend for themselves.
Judge Posner suggests a benign explanation for this attitude-per-
haps "[t] he union believes that these workers have other remedies
and that union intervention would unduly complicate the union's
role in dealing with the employer on behalf of all the workers com-
posing the bargaining unit." '165 Nevertheless, in practice it is often
not possible for workers to seek relief from their employers, and
many workers in the construction industry rely on their unions to
advocate on their behalf to secure a workplace free from
discrimination.
Altogether, this proposed standard is better because it brings
union liability in line with that of employers in situations where
unions have assumed similar responsibility for the terms and condi-
tions of the workplace. It also honors the remedial purpose of Ti-
tle VII by making available meaningful remedies for workers
experiencing discrimination in the construction industry. Further-
more, the affirmative defense encourages the union to take pre-
ventative measures, such as nondiscrimination training and the
development of a nondiscrimination policy and complaint proce-
dure, practices which are now standard for employers in other
industries.
B. Possible Criticism to Union Liability and a Response
Critics may argue that this standard will jeopardize other
union goals by requiring unions to allocate a disproportionate
share of union resources to the problem of workplace discrimina-
tion; that it creates an irreconcilable conflict of interest for unions
where fellow union members are responsible; and that it will cause
unions to close their eyes to hostile work environment harassment
in the workplace in order to shield themselves from liability. This
Section will address each of these arguments in turn.
First, Justice Powell and Judge Posner have argued that unions
should be free to determine how to allocate resources to meet the
164 Jimerson v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1423, 2005 WL 3533044, at *10
(S.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 2005).
165 EEOC v. Pipefitters Ass'n Local Union 597, 334 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2003).
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needs of their members, and that courts should not penalize un-
ions that, for one reason or another, choose not to make work-
place discrimination a priority.' 66 According to Justice Powell, the
elimination of race and sex discrimination is only one of many wor-
thy goals among which unions must choose-others include
higher wages, workplace safety, 16 7 and adequate pensions. 6 '
Given both the history of race and sex discrimination among
construction unions and the current composition of workers in the
industry, it is clear that, absent outside pressure, hostile work envi-
ronment discrimination will never be a priority for unions."' 9 In
Griggs v. Duke Power, an early Title VII case, the Supreme Court
emphasized that the purpose of Title VII is to break down barriers
to equal workforce participation. 171 So long as unions are permit-
ted to respond only to the workplace issues of the majority of their
current members and ignore those of its minority and female
members, the construction industry will remain largely white and
male. 
171
A second argument is that holding unions accountable for
hostile work environment discrimination will create an irresolvable
conflict of interest for unions when their own members create the
harassment. 72 Nevertheless, as Judge Rovner noted in her dissent-
166 Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 688-89 (1987) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing); Local Union 597, 334 F.3d at 661.
167 In addition to the usual dangers of construction work, women working in the
industry often face their own unique workplace safety issues. These include lack of
adequate sanitation facilities, the unavailability of properly fitting protective equip-
ment, poor safety training, and even the deliberate sabotage of safety equipment. See
generally OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH COMM'N, WOMEN IN THE CONSTRUCTION
WORKPLACE: PROVIDING EQUITABLE SAFETY AND HEALTH PROTECTION (1999), available
at http://www.osha.gov/doc/accsh/haswicformal.html.
168 Goodman, 482 U.S. at 688-89 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("A union must make diffi-
cult choices among goals such as eliminating racial discrimination in the workplace,
removing health and safety hazards, providing better insurance and pension benefits,
and increasing wages.").
169 Indeed, judging from Local 597's legacy of racism in job referrals-see supra
note 50-there is no reason to believe that the union would confront the issue of
workplace racism on its own initiative.
170 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) ("The objective of Con-
gress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have oper-
ated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees.").
171 Crain & Matheny, supra note 127, at 1542 (arguing that the labor union move-
ment is weakened by its failure to recognize race and gender divisions among its
members).
172 EEOC v. Pipefitters Ass'n Local Union 597, 334 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2003)
("There is also the awkwardness of asking the union to take sides in a dispute between
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ing opinion in Local 597, unions already deal with this sort of con-
flict when an employer disciplines a union member for
discriminatory conduct against a fellow union member.173 In such
a case, the union owes a duty of fair representation to both the
victim of harassment and the accused. 74 Furthermore, unions in
the construction industry are better situated to deal with the har-
assment than an employer because the relationship is longer and
the union is in a better position to prevent future discriminatory
conduct. Unlike many employers in the construction industry, un-
ions can provide nondiscrimination and anti-harassment training
and develop procedures to separate harassers from victims of dis-
crimination in job referrals.
Finally, it may be argued that unions will close their eyes to
hostile work environment discrimination in order to limit their Ti-
tle VII liability. It is unlikely that unions would relinquish their
authority over terms and conditions in the workplace simply to
avoid Title VII liability. After all, it is in the best interest of unions
to embrace their role as an advocate for all of its members in the
workplace. Additionally, the availability of the affirmative defense
will provide unions with an incentive to affirmatively address work-
place discrimination.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that unions which are aware of but fail
to address hostile environment discrimination against their mem-
bers should be liable under Title VII where they exercise a suffi-
cient degree of control over the workplace to address the
discriminatory conduct and their failure to act is unreasonable.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Pipefitters Association Local
Union 597, which relieves unions of liability for selective inaction in
the face of workplace discrimination, has been a setback for wo-
men and minorities in the construction industry. It fails to appreci-
ate the role unions have played in the perpetuation of hostile work
environment discrimination, leaving many workers without a
remedy.
two employees both of whom it has the statutory duty to represent fairly in any disci-
plinary proceeding by the employer.").
173 Id. at 665 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
174 Thorn v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 305 F.3d 826, 833 (8th Cir. 2002)
("When the employer investigates a sexual harassment claim by one union member
against another, the union has a statutory duty to fairly represent both in their disci-
plinary dealings with the employer.").
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